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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
These consolidated appeals require that we clarify our 
position with respect to the scope of the District Court's 
authority to remand, sua sponte, cases removed to the 
federal courts pursuant to the Federal Removal Statute, 28 
U.S.C. S 1441 et seq. (the Act). Specifically, we address 
whether a District Court exceeds its authority under 
section 1447(c) of the Act when it raises, sua sponte, a 
procedural defect in the petition for removal and remands 
the case on that basis. Because we are convinced that such 
sua sponte action falls outside the scope of section 1447(c), 
we conclude that the District Court lacked grounds upon 
which to remand these cases. We will, therefore, reverse the 
orders of the District Court remanding these actionsfiled 
against Medtronic and FMC. 
 
I. 
 
On January 15, 1999 Mary Anne and Michael Nelson 
filed a personal injury action against Medtronic in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey. Medtronic received formal 
service of the summons and complaint on February 8, 
1999. On February 24, 1999 Medtronic filed a notice of 
removal, on diversity grounds, in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey. 
 
At a status conference held in mid-March, 1999, the 
District Court, acting sua sponte, announced that it 
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intended to remand the matter to the state court due to a 
procedural defect in the notice of removal. According to the 
District Court, the notice of removal was deficient under the 
terms of 28 U.S.C. S 1446(b)1 in that it did not contain a 
specific statement establishing that the matter has been 
removed "within thirty days from receipt or otherwise." 
(emphasis added). Counsel for Medtronic noted that the 
notice of removal stated that Medtronic was served with the 
summons and complaint on February 8, 1999. Counsel 
clarified that this service effected Medtronic'sfirst receipt of 
the complaint. The plaintiffs did not contest this assertion 
and did not move for remand, although they stated that 
they did not object. The parties were given the opportunity 
to brief the issue of remand. 
 
On March 31, 1999, the District Court entered an order 
remanding the case to the Superior Court of New Jersey. 
The sole basis for remand was the fact that the notice of 
appeal failed explicitly to negate the possibility that 
Medtronic had received notice of the action through 
informal service of the initial pleading prior to the date of 
formal service.2 In ordering the remand, the District Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This section provides in part that: 
 
       The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be 
filed 
 
       within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through 
service 
       or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the 
claim 
       for relief . . . or within thirty days after the service of summons 
       upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in 
       court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever 
       period is shorter. 
 
2. The consolidated petition for writ of mandamusfiled in the product 
liability action captioned In re: FMC Corp., No. 99-5220, presents a 
similar factual and procedural scenario. FMC was served with a 
complaint in a state court action on December 2, 1998. On December 
21, 1998, FMC filed a notice of removal on diversity grounds. At a status 
conference on January 11, 1999, the District Court raised, sua sponte, 
the issue of whether FMC's notice of removal had been filed in a timely 
manner. Following briefing on the issue, it was clear that the petition 
for 
 
removal was timely filed, although this could not be ascertained from the 
four corners of the removal petition. Nonetheless, the District Court 
ordered, on March 1, 1999, that the action be remanded to a state court 
in New Jersey. FMC's petition for writ of mandamus was filed on March 
31, 1999. 
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relied on the holding in Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. v. 
Murphy Bros., Inc., 125 F.3d 1396, 1398 (11th Cir.), cert. 
granted, 119 S.Ct. 401 (1998). There, the Court of Appeals 
held that the period for removal begins to run when a 
defendant receives a copy of the initial pleading through 
any means, not strictly formal service of process. Medtronic 
appealed the remand order on April 30, 1999. 
 
Days after entry of the remand order, the Supreme Court 
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals in Michetti, 
holding that "a named defendant's time to remove is 
triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and 
complaint, or receipt of the complaint, `through service or 
otherwise,' after and apart from service of the summons, 
but not by mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any 
formal service." Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. v. Murphy Bros., 
Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 119 S. Ct. 1322, 1324 (quoting 28 
U.S.C. S 1446(b)) (emphasis added). This decision made 
clear that the procedural defect identified by the District 
Court in Medtronic's petition for removal is not, in fact, a 
procedural defect. 
 
On April 10, 1999, Medtronic filed in the District Court 
a motion to withdraw the order of remand in light of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Michetti. In an order dated 
April 14, 1999, the District Court denied the motion, 
stating that it no longer had jurisdiction to withdraw the 
remand order and that, in any event, the decision in 
Michetti did not apply retroactively to the order. Medtronic 
appealed from the District Court's order denying the motion 
to withdraw. 
 
Due to uncertainty as to the appropriate mechanism for 
appellate review, Medtronic, in an abundance of caution, 
also filed a petition for a writ of mandamus compelling the 
District Court to withdraw or reverse its remand order. This 
petition was consolidated with both of Medtronic's appeals 
and with the writ of mandamus filed by FMC. Medtronic 
contends that: 1) a procedural defect in the notice of 
removal must be raised in a motion by a party, not by the 
District Court; 2) the order of remand, even if authorized by 
statute, was not timely filed; and 3) because the Supreme 
Court decision in Michetti established that the defect which 
the District Court identified in Medtronic's petition for 
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removal is not to be considered a defect, the motion to 
withdraw the remand should have been granted. In its 
petition, FMC argues solely that where it clarified for the 
District Court that diversity existed and that the petition for 
removal was timely filed, the District Court should not have 
remanded the action.3 Because our holding with respect to 
the District Court's authority to raise, sua sponte, a 
procedural defect in the removal petition is alone a 
sufficient ground upon which to reverse the orders of 
remand, we need not and do not reach any other issue. 
 
II. 
 
We address first our jurisdiction to review the remand 
orders entered by the District Court. The threshold 
jurisdictional issue cannot be separated from the merits of 
the defendants' challenge; our analysis of the relevant 
statutory provisions both supports our jurisdiction and 
compels our conclusion that the District Court exceeded its 
authority in entering the remand orders. 
 
A comprehensive statutory scheme addresses removal of 
state court actions to federal court. 28 U.S.C.SS 1441- 
1452. We highlight certain provisions of that scheme and 
relevant caselaw in order to provide context for resolution of 
the issue before us. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 1441(a) provides that: 
 
       Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of 
       Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of 
       which the district courts of the United States have 
       original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant 
       or the defendants, to the district court . . . embracing 
       the place where such action is pending. 
 
Section 1446 sets forth the procedure for removing a case 
to federal court, and section 1441 delineates procedures to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. FMC's petition does not focus on the sua sponte nature of the District 
Court's decision to remand or on the timeliness of the District Court's 
order, although the facts would arguably support both of these 
arguments. FMC's petition was filed prior to and does not reference the 
Supreme Court's decision in Michetti. 
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be followed after an action has been removed. Section 
1447(c) reads in part, as follows: 
 
       A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect 
       in removal procedure must be made within 30 days 
       after the filing of the notice of removal under section 
       1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears 
       that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 
       the case shall be remanded.4 
 
Section 1447(d), which addresses the reviewability of 
orders to remand, narrowly limits our authority by 
providing that, except for civil rights cases removed 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1443: "[a]n order remanding a case 
to the state court from which it was removed is not 
reviewable on appeal or otherwise. . . ." In imposing this 
bar, Congress intended to make the remand order of a 
District Court final in order to avoid delay associated with 
appellate review of decisions to remand. In furtherance of 
this policy, section 1447(d) was interpreted, until 1976, to 
preclude review of all remand orders, regardless of the 
reason underlying the decision to remand. 
 
In 1976, the Supreme Court's decision in Thermtron 
Prod., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976), clarified 
that the section 1447(d) bar operates to preclude review of 
only those remand orders issued pursuant to section 
1447(c). The Court held that these two sections must be 
construed together and that "only remand orders issued 
under S 1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified therein 
. . . are immune from review under S 1447(d). Id. at 346. 
Thermtron thus made clear that the seemingly unequivocal 
language of section 1447(d) may, in some circumstances, 
give way to permit appellate consideration of certain 
categories of remand orders. One such category includes 
remand orders issued outside the authority granted to 
District Courts under section 1447(c). For reasons 
explained herein, we find that the District Court exceeded 
its authority under 1447(c) when it acted sua sponte to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It is important to recognize that this section provides for remand in 
two categories of cases: (1) those where a motion identifies a "defect in 
the removal procedure"; or (2) those where the District Court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
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remand these cases. Accordingly, our review of these 
remand orders is not barred by the terms of section 
1447(d). 
 
After Thermtron, mandamus has regularly been invoked 
to require federal courts to adjudicate claims not remanded 
pursuant to S 1447(c). See, e.g., Airshields, Inc. v. Fullam, 
891 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1989) (granting petition for writ of 
mandamus directing the court to vacate a remand order 
based on procedural defects not contemplated by section 
1447(c)). The use of mandamus as the mechanism for 
review stemmed from the Supreme Court's statement in 
Thermtron that mandamus rather than appeal was 
appropriate. The Supreme Court decision in Quackenbush 
v. Allstate Insurance Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996), 
however, establishes that resort to mandamus is not 
necessary, because a remand order, although it does not 
meet the traditional definition of finality, is"functionally 
indistinguishable from the stay . . . found appealable in 
Moses H. Cone" and should therefore be deemedfinal. Id. at 
715. Here, as in Quackenbush and Cone , the order puts the 
litigants "effectively out of court." The Supreme Court in 
Quackenbush noted that in this sense, a remand order is 
"clearly more final than a stay order." Id. at 714. 
 
In a case similar to the one we consider here, the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit commented that: 
 
       Appeal rather than mandamus is the right route. 
       Although Thermtron stated that mandamus is essential 
       and appeal impermissible, Quackenbush reversed 
       that conclusion. 517 U.S. at 714-15. The Court 
       [in Quackenbush] observed that the[mandamus 
       requirement] of Thermtron had been based on 
       [an earlier] decision the Justices now deem 
       "superannuated." 517 U.S. at 715. A remand order 
       terminates the litigation in federal court and therefore 
       after Quackenbush is appealable as a "final decision" 
       under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 -- unless S 1447(d) forecloses 
       appeal . . . . 
 
Benson v. SI Handling Systems, Inc., 188 F.3d 780, 782 
(7th Cir. 1999). We have adhered to this reading of 
Quackenbush: "Because the District Court's remand order 
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divest[s] the federal court of all control over the action . . ., 
we . . . have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291." Pa. 
Nurses Ass'n v. Pa. State Educ. Ass'n, 90 F.3d 797, 801 (3d 
Cir. 1996).5 While we do not rule out our jurisdiction over 
a petition for mandamus, where the order is, as the 
decision in Quackenbush stated, "final," an appeal, with its 
broader scope of review, would appear to be the preferred 
route. 
 
Having established that the section 1447(d) bar does not 
apply to all remand orders and that if review is appropriate 
it may be secured by appeal rather than mandamus, we 
turn to the seminal question: Did the District Court exceed 
its authority under section 1447(c) when it raised, sua 
sponte, a procedural defect in the petitions for removal and 
remanded these actions on that basis? This question is 
seminal because in deciding it we will determine not only 
whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal, but also the 
propriety of the District Court's remand. 
 
Although this precise question is one of first impression 
for our court, we have addressed a closely-related question. 
In Air-Shields, Inc. v. Fullam, 891 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1989), we 
granted a petition for mandamus directing the District 
Court to vacate a remand order entered based on the 
Court's sua sponte identification of a procedural defect in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See also Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, 
Jurisdiction 2d S 3914.11 (stating that remand terminating all 
proceedings in a federal court is final; if appeal is barred it is by 
S 1447(d), not for want of finality); In re Bethesda Mem. Hosp. Inc., 123 
F.3d 1407, 1408 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that:"Quackenbush holds that 
a District Court's order to remand a case to state court is a final 
judgment that can be reviewed on direct appeal); Eastus v. Blue Bell 
Creameries, L.P., 97 F.3d 100, 103 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that remand 
order is reviewable after Quackenbush where it (1) puts litigants out of 
federal court; (2) conclusively determines whether jurisdiction will be 
exercised; (3) party's right to have matter litigated in federal court is 
important; and (4) order cannot be reviewed if state court continues to 
hear case); Gaming Corp. of America v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 
542 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that after Quackenbush appeal rather than 
mandamus is appropriate where by remand District Court surrendered 
jurisdiction and there is no other opportunity to appeal decision in 
federal court). 
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the removal petition. Our focus, however, was solely upon 
the timeliness of the remand order. In Air-Shields, we wrote: 
 
       Even if the district court's sua sponte action qualifies 
       as a motion under . . . . 28 U.S.C. S 1442(c), the 
       district court could only remand within 30 days of the 
       filing of the notice to remove . . . By remanding the 
       case for procedural defects after the thirty day limit 
       imposed by the revised Section 1447(c) had expired the 
       district court "exceeded its statutorily defined power." 
 
891 F.2d at 65-66 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). As a result, our review was "not limited by 
subsection (d) of Section 1447;" and the petition for 
mandamus was granted. Id. at 66. In Air-Shields, "[w]e did 
not decide whether the District Court was ever permitted to 
remand for a defect in the removal petition absent a motion 
by a party." Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ward Trucking Co., 48 
F.3d 742, 760 n.8 (3d Cir. 1995) (J. Becker, dissenting). 
 
In Korea Exchange Bank v. Trackwise Sales, 66 F.3d 46 
(3d Cir. 1995), we again considered a timeliness challenge 
to a District Court's remand order. Some seven months 
after the petition for removal was filed, the District Court, 
acting sua sponte, remanded an action for failure to comply 
with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. S 1441(b). After 
concluding that the irregularity in the petition was a 
procedural defect rather than a jurisdictional requirement,6 
we considered the substance of 28 U.S.C. S 1447(c), 
focusing as we did in Air-Shields on the timing of the 
District Court's remand order. We wrote: 
 
       [I]t is clear under section 1447(c) that [the procedural] 
       irregularity must be the subject of a motion to remand 
       within 30 days after filing the notice of removal. We 
       have held that the 30-day time limit of section 1447(c) 
       applies not only to motions brought by a party, but also 
       to sua sponte orders of remand. See Air Shields, 891 
       F.2d at 65. It follows ineluctably that the District Court 
       in this case had no statutory authority to issue the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We clarified that "an irregularity in removal of a case to federal 
court 
 
is to be considered `jurisdictional' only if the case could not initially 
have 
been filed in federal court." 66 F.3d at 50. 
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       remand order after the 30-day period because the 
       defect was in the removal procedure rather than a lack 
       of subject matter jurisdiction, which could be raised at 
       any time. For the same reason, our review of the 
       remand order is not barred by section 1447(d). 
 Id. at 50-51 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
The parties in Korea Exchange Bank did not challenge the 
District Court's authority to raise a procedural defect sua 
sponte and, with the exception of the single sentence 
highlighted above, we did not address that aspect of the 
case. We address that issue for the first time here. 
 
While we are convinced that the decision in Korea 
Exchange Bank does not resolve the issue now before us, 
we recognize that the District Court read the emphasized 
language in the quotation from Korea Exchange Bank above 
to establish "unequivocally" that a timely sua sponte 
remand on procedural grounds is authorized under section 
1447(c). We cannot agree. As we have noted, our focus in 
Korea Exchange Bank was solely on the timeliness of the 
District Court's sua sponte remand. The single sentence 
which the District Court lifts out of that case is best viewed 
as dictum. We did not intend that sentence to dispose of an 
important issue which we had yet to face head-on. 
 
At the time of our decision in Korea Exchange Bank, four 
of our sister Courts of Appeals had addressed the very 
question that we face here, concluding that the language of 
section 1447(c) does not authorize a District Court's sua 
sponte remand of an action based on a defect in the 
petition for removal, even where that remand is timely.7 
Our failure in Korea Exchange Bank to reference those 
decisions and to express any disagreement with the 
reasoning supporting them militates heavily against the 
conclusion that we intended, in a single sentence, to take 
a contrary position. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See In re First National Bank of Boston , 70 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir.), 
vacated as moot, 102 F.3d 1157 (1996) (District Courts are without 
discretion to remand sua sponte for procedural defects within the 30-day 
period after filing of removal notice); Page v. City of Southfield, 45 
F.3d 
 
128 (6th Cir. 1995) (same); In re Continental Casualty Co., 29 F.3d 292 
(7th Cir. 1994) (same); and In re Allstate Insurance Co., 8 F.3d 219 (5th 
Cir. 1995) (same). 
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In order to dispel any possible confusion flowing from the 
language in Korea Exchange Bank, we now align ourselves 
with the other Courts of Appeals which have considered 
timely sua sponte remands. We hold that the District Court 
exceeded its authority under section 1447(c) when it 
remanded these actions, sua sponte, based on what it 
identified as procedural defects in the petition for removal. 
In formulating this holding, we adopt the reasoning 
underlying the decision in In re Continental Casualty 
Company, 29 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 1994). There, the Court 
concluded that a motion made by a party "is essential to a 
remand under the first sentence of section 1447(c)." Id. at 
294. In support of this conclusion, the Court wrote: 
 
       Ever since Ayers v. Watson, 113 U.S. 594 (1885), it has 
       been accepted that non-jurisdictional objections to 
       removal may be waived. The plaintiff has a right to 
       remand if the defendant did not take the right steps 
       when removing, but the plaintiff also may accept the 
       defendant's choice of a federal forum. Procedural 
       defects in removal are in this respect similar to the 
       lack of personal jurisdiction and other shortcomings 
       that may be waived or forfeited. Having found himself 
       in federal court after removal, the plaintiff may want to 
       stay there. A remand on the court's own motion may 
       deprive both sides of their preferred forum . . . . 
       Instead of trying to resolve procedural questions on its 
       own, only to find out that the answer does not matter, 
       the district judge should wait for the parties to reveal 
       whether they want to continue in federal court. 
 
Id. at 294-95. We agree. We embrace, too, this Continental 
Casualty caveat: 
 
       Sua sponte remands before the 30 days are up do not 
       upset the parties' expectations or require redoing 
       things in multiple forums, but they pose dangers of 
       their own. By acting without any motion, district 
       judges increase the risk of error -- both legal error and 
       error in understanding the parties' desires. 
 
Id. at 295. 
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III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the District 
Court exceeded its statutory authority under section 
1446(c) in entering the remand orders in these actions. 
Accordingly, the bar to review by appeal set forth in 1447(d) 
does not apply. Although FMC did not file a document 
labeled "notice of appeal," its petition for mandamus 
contains all of the information required under Fed. R. App. 
P. 3. It may, therefore, be treated as a notice of appeal, see 
Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (1992), provided that it was 
filed, as it was, within the 30-day limit set by Fed. R. App. 
P. 4(a)(1). Because jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, 
we will dismiss the petitions for mandamus filed by 
Medtronic as moot and will reverse the orders of remand 
entered by the District Court in each of the underlying 
actions. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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